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ABSTRACT 
The inward mobility of labour can serve as a driver of economic growth and the immigration 
policies of many countries are orientated towards this end. However immigration is also a 
contentious issue, with the general public often displaying hostility towards liberal 
immigration policies. The compromises between economic and political considerations that 
states make when developing immigration policy are poorly theorised in academic literature. 
This study contributes to conceptual understandings of the voices of ‘elites’ in the political-
economy of immigration policy through a critical interrogation of the narratives and 
preferences of employers in the context of the Scottish constitutional change debate.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Immigration can drive economic growth, but it is also a highly contentious issue. One of 
the central responsibilities of independent nation states is to formulate and implement an 
immigration policy; that is to legislate on the quantities of migrants that can legitimately 
enter a country, their qualities, and the source countries that they can come from (Bach, 
2010). Such decisions inevitably incur compromises between competing policy agendas. 
On the one hand, economic theory postulates that liberal ‘open-door’ immigration 
policies are most conducive to the aggregate economic welfare of countries (Giordani 
and Ruta, 2011). However there are few, if any, examples of developed countries 
operating open-door immigration policies. Conceptually, this paradox has been referred 
to as the ‘immigration policy puzzle’: liberal immigration policies favour economic 
growth yet they are not fully pursued by states (Giordani and Ruta, 2011, 922). This 
contradiction can be explained by the fact that most governments are democratically 
accountable, typically to electorates that are opposed to significant levels of immigration. 
For example the 2013 version of the respected British Social Attitudes survey pointed to 
over three quarters (77%) of the British public wanting a reduction in immigration, the 
highest proportion ever recorded in the surveys 20 year history (BSA, 2014).  
 
  However public opinion cannot fully explain immigration policy, since this would 
result in legislation being much more restrictive than is usually the case. Theoretically 
this disparity between the restrictionist desires of the public (and reductionist rhetoric 
from politicians) and the actual immigration policies implemented by governments has 
been described as the ‘public opinion gap’ and has been found to exist in most developed 
countries (Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Freeman, 2002). 
 
  States thus have an ambivalent approach to migration, with immigration policy 
being an inconsistent compromise between the interests of business (liberal immigration 
policy)  and those of the electorate (restrictive immigration policy). How do 
democratically accountable governments go about ‘squaring the circle’ between these 
mutually opposing interests? The literature on the political-economy of migration policy 
is sparse (Facchini et al, 2008) and the studies which have been conducted frequently rely 
on statistical abstractions of the ‘optimal’ levels of migration (Benhabib, 1996) (Giordani 
and Ruta, 2011). Additionally, theoretical understandings of international labour mobility  
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have tended to ignore or underplay the role of the state in actively channelling such 
flows. Contrary to this Morawska (2007) does incorporate the state into her 
understanding of international migration, arguing that a small number of hegemonic 
states dominate global trade, finance and mobility patterns through the concentration of 
political and economic power. This develops the pertinent point that governments do not 
just arbitrate between different interests in immigration policy, but are an important actor 
in stimulating and perpetuating international migration (Russell, 1989; McCollum et al, 
2013). Whilst valuable in identifying the state as a migration channel as well as 
intermediary, these perspectives have however shied away from conceptualising the 
preferences and actions of important actors in the process of immigration legislation 
formation. Immigration policy theory is thus an underdeveloped field (Meyers, 2000); 
with only a small number of scholars seeking to bridge the gap between political 
economy and migration studies (see Cerna, 2014; Caviedes, 2010; Menz, 2011 for 
praiseworthy exceptions).  
 
  This investigation seeks to contribute to understandings of immigration policy 
theory by examining the preferences and role of one particular group of actors; 
employers. The following section offers a review of the existent literature on this topic. 
This is followed by a description of the Scottish case and the ways in which it can act as 
an empirical lens through which the political-economy of immigration policy can be 
explored. The methodological perspectives employed in the research are then discussed, 
followed by a presentation of the research findings. The article concludes by considering 
how these sit within and may advance theoretical understandings of the political-
economy of immigration policy. 
 
2.  THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION POLICY: 
EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS 
The issues considered in this analysis sit broadly within so-called domestic politics 
models of immigration policy theory. The starting point for these perspectives is that the 
state is a neutral space, whose function is to adjudicate between competing interests. 
According to Meyers (2000) policymaking then is the end result of bargaining and 
compromises between these interests or, more radically, a consequence of one or more of 
these actors capturing the state. This is a point well-argued by scholars such as Anderson  
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(2010) and Scott (2013), who contend that immigration policies can serve to produce 
‘precarious’ or ‘good’ workers over whom employers and labour users have particular 
mechanisms of control. There is a long history of employers in Britain and elsewhere 
seeking to encourage more liberal immigration regimes (Collins, 1988; Esser and Korte, 
1985; Freeman, 1979; Craig, 1971) and according to Menz (2011) and Spencer (2003) 
these pressures have been influential in the liberalisation of national labour migration 
policies across Europe since the mid-1990s.  
 
  Perhaps the most prolific commentator on the political economy of immigration 
policy is the US political scientist Gary Freeman. In line with Anderson (2010), Freeman 
(1995) draws parallels between the configuration of immigration policies and pro-
business interests. In this sense the ‘public opinion gap’ on immigration policy (Facchini 
and Mayda, 2009) is said to exist because the electoral system is regarded as an 
ineffective means of directly mandating specific policy choices (Freeman, 1995). As a 
consequence interest groups such as employers, ethnic groups, trade unions and 
nationalist groupings, despite each only representing a minority of the population, can 
have a disproportionate influence on immigration policy (Meyers, 2000). As Freeman 
and Kessler point out, this is because ‘in the legislative, administrative and electoral 
process the interests of organised groups are more important than the opinions of 
individuals’ (2008, 670). The relative strength of the interest groups who benefit from 
immigration is said to lead to a ‘client politics’ (Freeman, 1995, 886) whereby 
organisations favouring expansionist immigration policies develop and nurture 
relationships with the officials responsible for immigration policy and influence policy in 
other surreptitious ways beyond the scrutiny of public debate. Immigration policy is thus 
often portrayed as the result of an organised pro-migration lobby ‘winning over’ a 
resource weak and diffuse anti-migration lobby. 
 
  Much of the literature discussed above centres primarily on the US context, where 
pro-business influences on immigration policy may be expected to be relatively powerful. 
Few studies have attempted to explore how these dynamics operate in other contexts. A 
notable exception is the work of Statham and Geddes (2006) on the drivers of UK 
immigration politics. Taking a contrasting position to that espoused by Freeman, this 
approach focuses on the salient point that immigration policy is influenced by much more 
than just collective action by interest groups. A somewhat obvious but important point in  
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this respect is that the actual mechanisms, and effects, of pro-business/migration interest 
group influence on policy are ill suited to empirical elucidation. Thus it would be 
foolhardy to make the case that employers (presuming homogeneity and a clear and 
unified voice) exert X influence via Y strategies and that the resultant immigration policy 
is Z. Rather a much more realistic approach may be to conceive of pro-
businesses/immigration voices as a potentially powerful force in immigration policy 
formation, but as a set of voices that competes internally and with other influential actors, 
that speaks with different accents and that exerts influence in often intangible, unintended 
and contradictory ways (Caviedes, 2010).  
 
  As opposed to a pro-business lobby or sceptical public directly determining 
immigration policy, Statham and Geddes (2006) make the valuable point that it is 
political elites (politicians and government officials) who are the ultimate actors in 
producing policy. These elites are said to be relatively insensitive to direct action by 
interest groups, but instead consciously and subconsciously ‘internalise’ the messages 
purveying from opinion polls, the media and business groups; which in turn goes on to 
influence their policy decisions in often imperceptible ways. Another adept study of 
interest group influence on immigration policy is provided by Menz (2011), who 
examines what he calls the important but widely overlooked role of employer 
associations in shaping immigration legislation. Again, Menz (2011) emphasises that 
there is not a direct causal link between employer preferences and practices and 
immigration policy, and that such a link, if it does exist, is difficult to assess empirically. 
Key actors in terms of pro-immigration business interest groups in the UK include 
organisations such as the British Chambers of Commerce and the Confederation of 
British Industry. Sector specific interest groups also exist, such as Oil UK and the 
Recruitment and Employment Confederation for example. These employer associations 
are each comprised of a large number of individual businesses and whilst they claim to 
‘lobby’ policymakers for expansionist immigration legislation, the academic literature 
has little to say about how these strategies operate, how effective they ultimately are or 
whether they accurately reflect the preferences of the multifarious business interests that 
they claim to represent.  
 
  A criticism that can be levied at the perspectives discussed above is that, whilst 
they consider whether immigration policy can be influenced by special interest groups  
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such as employers, they do not attempt the admittedly challenging task of deciphering 
how these processes might operate. Another important point to draw attention to is the 
limitations of employer influence. Immigration policies are patently more expansive than 
the general public would wish them to be, which could be attributed to pro-business 
influences. However they are also much less expansionist than businesses would like 
them to be. Therefore immigration policy might be seen as a messy compromise between 
economics and politics, a trade-off in which the interests of neither is fully satisfied. This 
is a tricky dilemma that has faced policymakers for some time, with Western European 
governments having largely failed in their initial attempts to import labour but not people 
(Castles and Kosack, 1973).  
 
  Related to this point is the view put forward by Boswell, who makes the case that 
states often practice what she terms ‘intentional incoherence’ (2007, 96) in policymaking. 
This policy ‘incoherence’ is regarded as a deliberate ploy, which allows the state to 
follow an economic growth agenda whilst also retaining its ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of its 
citizens through calculated (but usually limited) anti-immigration rhetoric and measures. 
The motive behind ostensibly muddled immigration policies may therefore be to attempt 
to at least partially simultaneously satisfy pro- and anti-immigration interests. The policy 
balance between these competing interests inevitably varies over time and across space. 
The particular applicability of these debates to the Scottish case is discussed below. 
 
3.  IMMIGRATION PATTERNS, PERCEPTIONS AND 
POLICIES: THE SCOTTISH CASE  
In some respects the case of Scotland can be thought of as rather particular with regards 
to migration. Firstly, Scotland is an advanced developed nation yet until recently it lost 
more people than it has gained through migration. Consequently international migrants 
make up a small part of Scotland’s population relative to many other European countries 
(Packwood and Findlay, 2014). Secondly, analysis of social attitudes survey data infers 
that the general public in Scotland is somewhat hostile to immigration, but less so than is 
the case in other parts of the UK (McCollum et al, 2014). Thirdly a modest rate of natural 
increase means that Scotland is heavily reliant on immigration for demographic stability 
and growth in the short to medium terms. Recognition of these demographic trends, 
coupled with a conviction that immigration can boost economic growth, has led the  
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Scottish Government to enact an official Population Target, which aims to see population 
growth in Scotland match the EU-15 average over the period 2007-2017 (Scottish 
Government, 2011).  
 
  Whilst it could be argued that Scotland ‘needs’ migrants on demographic and 
economic grounds, and has a population that is relatively less hostile towards 
immigration, paradoxically at the time of writing (July 2014) the Scottish Government 
had little direct control over immigration policy. Under the 1998 Scotland Act which 
reinstated the Scottish Parliament, the immigration system and border controls were 
issues which remained ‘reserved’ to the UK government. The positive policy rhetoric in 
Scotland concerning migration stands in stark contrast to debates at the UK level 
generally, where the issue of immigration frequently dominates the political agenda and 
is regularly discussed in pejorative terms. Despite the Office for Budget Responsibility 
(2013) highlighting the fiscal benefits of immigration, the mainstream political parties in 
Westminster are firmly committed to reductions as opposed to increases in international 
inflows. As such, whilst the Scottish Government wishes to pursue modestly expansionist 
immigration policies, it is currently unable to do so and must instead operate under the 
same ‘one size fits all’ immigration legislation as the rest of the UK.  
 
  Whilst the ultimate outcome of the 2014 plebiscite was a ‘No’  vote, the 
referendum represented an opportunity for Scotland to develop a more nuanced 
immigration policy that fits more closely with its needs, either through full independence 
or further devolution of powers from Westminster. The possibility of change provided an 
opportunity for employers to identify the immigration policy issues that are relevant to 
their businesses. In the UK as elsewhere, employers collaborate with the state to access 
international labour (Rodriguez, 2004). From an employer’s perspective, there are 
grounds for optimism in this regard: the Scottish Government has consistently espoused 
the benefits of immigration and has sought to attract specific types of migrants to 
Scotland (most notably students with the potential to add to the country’s talent pool). In 
the Scotland’s Future White Paper, the Scottish Government reiterated this desire, stating 
that: ‘Scotland has a different need for immigration than other parts of the UK… the 
current UK immigration system has not supported Scotland’s migration priorities’ 
(Scottish Government, 2013, 267-8). Interestingly in the Scottish case and elsewhere, 
pro-immigration politics produce what Freeman and Kessler (2008, 672) term ‘strange  
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bedfellow’ coalitions consisting of a curious mix of cosmopolitans, employers and ethnic 
minority groups, each in favour of expansionist immigration policies but for very 
different reasons. According to Cerna (2014) the varying ability of these pro-immigration 
coalitions to exert pressure on governments can explain variations in immigration 
policies in specific spatial and temporal contexts. Scotland is therefore an interesting 
empirical lens through which the political economy of immigration policy can be 
explored. The ‘coalition’ favouring immigration in Scotland is arguably broader than is 
the case in the UK generally and includes the groups traditionally in favour of 
immigration (employers, ethnic groups) but also the mainstream political parties and a 
relatively large part of the public. However even in Scotland a potentially significant pro-
immigration coalition sits against wider voter opposition by some members of the general 
public to immigration. Whilst the general public in Scotland are less hostile to 
immigration than other parts of the UK, a majority of Scots are opposed to rather than in 
favour of future inflows (McCollum et al, 2014; Bell et al, 2014). The three research 
questions which the research aimed to address were; 
1.  What narratives and discourses do employers invoke to try and justify their desires 
concerning immigration policies? 
2.  How articulate are employers with regards to the particular immigration policies 
that they would like to see enacted? 
3.  To what extent are employers actively engaged in strategies to achieve their 
preferred immigration policies? 
4.  METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE  
As Scott (2013) and Rodriguez (2004) have pointedly argued, employer-orientated 
research remains an unjustifiably neglected area of migration studies. The focus of this 
analysis is on how employers and employer associations in Scotland go about framing 
their preferences regarding immigration policies. Signiﬁcantly, the literature emphasises 
that the ‘requirement’ for migrant labour should not be regarded as a ‘given’. Rather 
‘labour shortages are socially, economically, culturally and politically constructed and ... 
need not exist’ (Geddes and Scott 2010: 211). Alternatives to the widespread use of 
migrant labour could arguably be pursued by employers, such as offering higher wages to 
attract more local labour into work or the substitution of capital for labour. Thus, it is 
important to question why employers elect to perceive and represent migrant labour as 
essential or desirable, and to investigate the nature of the relationship between these  
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discourses and immigration policy in terms of how states legislate on the quantities of 
migrants that can legitimately enter a country, their qualities, and the source countries 
that they can come from. This analysis aims to critically examine the narratives created 
by labour market actors to rationalise why Scotland should have a relatively liberal 
immigration policy.  
 
  Employer discourses surrounding migration therefore are significant and worthy 
of scrutiny because they will represent a powerful voice in the debates over the future of 
Scotland’s stance towards immigration. Of course employers in Scotland are a far from 
homogenous group, and many individuals within firms hold views towards constitutional 
change and immigration that are at odds with the economically rational ‘pro-business’ 
view that Scotland should have influence over its immigration policy and that it should 
enact expansionist legislation. In line with Caviedes’s (2010) reminder that there is often 
little consensus amongst employers or dominant economic sectors in terms of influence 
on immigration policy, the analysis seeks to be sensitive to the tensions and internal 
contradictions that exist within the discourses constructed by elites (such as Scottish 
employers).  
 
  This approach hopes to advance academic understandings of employer discourses 
surrounding labour and immigration and how they should be conceptualised. Scholarship 
on this issue can be guilty of homogenising employers and treating them uniformly as 
‘elites’. Scotland is not alone in having a diverse economy, thus the term ‘employers’ 
covers a broad range of firms of varying sizes, sectors and priorities: at risk of stating the 
obvious the practices and preferences of a large multinational oil firm operating in the 
North Sea are very different to those of a small fruit farm in rural Perthshire. As well as 
recognising tensions between employers, it is important to recognise that firms are 
collections of individuals. So whilst businesses may seek to influence policy decisions in 
their favour, the policies that they argue for may well be at odds with the personal views 
of many of the individuals that constitute the staff of these firms. For example an HR 
manager may be opposed to migration on a personal level, but recognise its positive 
impact on the functioning of his/her business. Academic analysis needs to be sensitive to 
these internal contradictions and tensions within ‘employer’ narratives. This has 
implications for understandings of the apparent tussle between employers and the 
electorate in terms of the desired orientation of immigration policies and for thinking  
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about which ‘voices’ academics should privilege when reporting on these debates. The 
following section describes the data collection strategy that was undertaken in this 
research.  
 
This research involved research interviews with twenty  employers and employer 
associations in a number of key economic sectors in Scotland in the second half of 2013. 
The interviews were designed to solicit employer views of: immigration policy, how 
effective it is in meeting their needs and whether the prospect of constitutional change in 
Scotland was seen as an opportunity to try and push for more favourable policy rhetoric 
and practice. One of the challenges associated with interviewing elites is access (Rice, 
2010). Initially this was facilitated through contacts with large Scottish employers and 
inter-business organisations. However most interviews were secured through a tactic of 
‘cold calling’ specific businesses. Around one in five of the businesses contacted in this 
manner ended up participating in the research. The most commonly cited reasons for 
non-participation were that potential respondents felt they could not offer anything of 
value to the research or that they simply did not have time to take part.  
 
  Employer preferences have been shown to vary by sector (Caviedes, 2010), for 
this reason organisations in parts of the Scottish economy which attach a relatively high 
importance to the availability of migrant labour were particularly targeted to take part in 
the interviews.  These sectors were identified using an online survey,  designed by the 
authors, disseminated through the Scottish Chambers of Commerce and completed by 
over 700 employers in early summer 2013 (Tindal et al, 2014). The sectors emerging 
from the survey as being of particular interest were: health and social care, hospitality 
and tourism, construction, retail, property, agriculture, wholesale, and transport and 
storage. The researchers also wished to gain the perspectives of high-value sectors in the 
Scottish economy, and so finance and insurance, oil and gas, and higher education were 
also incorporated into the sample.   
 
  Given likely variations in migration preferences by employer size (Caviedes, 
2010), the companies covered by the research ranged from small employers to large 
multi-national corporations. In the case of small or medium sized companies, the 
interviewees were usually company directors. For larger organisations, the interviewees 
were most often directors of human resources or directors of operations. Other  
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stakeholders that were included were directors or representatives of inter-business 
organisations, or representatives of specific economic sectors. Many of the stakeholders 
interviewed also held positions in specific companies as well as working as industry 
representatives. These stakeholders generally had an expansive overview of the sector as 
a whole, identifying challenges and opportunities that exist in the respective sectors that 
they represent, not just for specific companies. Ten of the twenty interviews were with 
employers and the other half were with stakeholders (inter-business organisations and 
representatives of specific economic sectors). Pseudonyms have been used to protect 
respondent anonymity. 
 
5.  ANALYSIS: ‘ELITE’ VOICES, IMMIGRATION AND 
IMMIGRATION POLICY   
The investigation focuses on three key themes: (1) the narratives used by employers and 
employer associations to construct immigration as being a ‘good thing’, (2) articulations 
of the ‘ideal’ immigration policy for Scotland, and (3) the strategies used to try and 
influence immigration policies at the UK and Scotland levels. The discussion seeks to be 
sensitive to the tensions and contradictions between and within these narratives. The 
findings are then used to consider the wider implications for how employers’ voices are 
conceptualised in migration research.  
 
5.1.  IMMIGRATION AS A ‘GOOD THING’  
Not surprisingly the research found that employers universally spoke of immigration in 
positive economic terms. In general migrants were lauded as filling labour shortages, 
particularly in rural areas and in instances where the local supply of labour is derided as 
being of poor quality. Towards the higher end of the labour market, migrant workers 
were described as essential in addressing sector specific skills shortages (e.g. in 
healthcare and oil and gas) and as a catalyst for growth for multinational companies with 
operations in Scotland (e.g. through intra-company transfers). The underlying factors 
driving businesses to either require or favour immigrant skills are well rehearsed 
(Anderson and Ruhs, 2010) and are not repeated here. What is more interesting is how 
immigration was positioned as being a ‘good thing’ not only for their specific businesses 
but for Scotland more generally. Employers sought to align their business interests with 
what they thought represented those of Scotland’s economy, thus legitimising their  
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preferences for supporting liberal immigration policies. The narratives constructed by 
interviewees to frame immigration as being of value to Scotland are summarised in Table 
1.  
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Narrative   Signifiers of ‘value’  
Demographic boost: improves working age 
population relative to retirees   
‘We need more people in Scotland, not less… 
our population is getting older and that’s not a 
recipe for success… so we definitely need 
more migrants in Scotland’ 
Wayne. inter-company organisation   
Spurs economic growth and net fiscal benefit   ‘High end immigration is what is required to 
drive the economy recovery…and these people 
are paying huge quantities of tax, so it makes 
no sense whatsoever to limit it’. 
Paula, finance company  
Boost Scottish economy by filling skills and 
labour gaps  
‘Dentists are in very short supply in Scotland… 
and Romania has got exactly the same 
dentistry qualification, so academically they are 
absolutely a hundred per cent qualified for the 
role’.  
Daniel, recruitment firm  
Positive characteristics of migrants   ‘A lot of the A8 workers are skilled 
professionals and they’ve settled here and 
contributed to the local economy, unlike our 
unemployed they don’t rely on benefits… it’s 
not in their culture’.  
Thomas, hospitality recruitment firm  
Table 1: Employer narratives regarding the benefits of immigration for Scotland 
 
As the above quotations illustrate, respondents made plausible cases for why their desires 
for migrant labour were closely aligned with the interests of Scotland more generally. 
These narratives involved the construction of a discourse that Scotland was ‘different’ to 
other parts of the UK, particularly southern England and as such merited a ‘distinctive’ 
policy approach to immigration.  
 
‘The demographic situation here [in Scotland] is frightening, so we definitely need 
migrants. We need more people in Scotland, not less… the rest of the UK, actually sorry 
the South East of England in particular, probably doesn’t need them and they have got 
some real problems with immigration… but Scotland’s problems in that area are not the 
same at all and we shouldn’t allow UK immigration to be dictated by London I’m afraid’.  
Wayne, inter-company organisation 
 
  Scholarly musings on the construction of differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
in national contexts have a long history and are perhaps best exemplified by Said’s  
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(1978) feted treatises concerning Orientalism and Othering. These ideas are particularly 
interesting in the Scotland-UK context. As Cohen (1994) has ably noted, the UK is 
unusual in having four distinct ‘nations’ (Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland) 
within a single state. Thus when Wayne refers to differing migration needs and 
experiences between ‘we’ (Scotland) and ‘they’ (rest of the UK/South-East England), he 
invokes the notion of the idiosyncratic psychological ‘fuzzy’ internal boundaries that 
prevail within the UK (Cohen, 1995). These complex processes of spatial differentiation 
play an important role in making the case for different policy measures across space. 
Framing Scotland as different from ‘the rest of the UK/South-East England’ (in 
economic, demographic or cultural terms) seeks to rally support for more geographically 
nuanced immigration policies.  
 
  In contrast to other research (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Koven and Götzke, 2010; 
Facchini et al, 2008), which often presents employers as solely promoting the benefits of 
immigration, it was clear from the interviews that respondents acknowledged the 
potential negative externalities of their business needs for immigration. There was 
recognition that public and political concern existed in relation to immigration and that 
they could ‘understand’ this unease.  
 
‘I can completely understand why the UK Government would want to control unskilled 
immigration, because we are all British and we want to do what’s best for Britain, so we 
do have to be aware of the unemployment issue and of bringing people through the 
ranks… we all get that. But we are restricted because there is lot of unemployed people 
in Scotland and most of them just do not have the skills to work in such a dangerous 
environment’.  
Olivia, oil and gas 
 
  Note Olivia’s contention that ‘we are all British’ and ‘want to do what’s best for 
Britain’. This view stands in contrast with many other employers, who positioned ‘what’s 
best for Britain’ (particularly southern England) as being against Scotland’s interests. In 
this sense, constructions of place play an important role in the narratives used to 
rationalise views towards immigration policy, and the extent to which business and/or 
public interest fits with ‘national’ interest.  
 
  Whilst the business gains from immigration were praised and prioritised, familiar 
pejorative stereotypes surrounding immigrants emerged, reflecting ambivalence about 
immigration on the part of the very people whose companies benefitted from it.   
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‘Scotland financially could not cope with an influx of hundreds of thousands of Eastern 
Europeans… we refuse to take Latvians and Lithuanians now because their work ethic is 
shocking. They come here and they don’t work, they just want to come and drink… 
unfortunately our benefits system seems to look like a pot of gold, so they [migrants] just 
come over and live off it’. 
Harriet, agribusiness  
 
  Employers universally praised the advantages of immigration from a business 
perspective (see Table 1), yet many of the very same individuals made disparaging 
comments about migrants. This apparent contradiction might seem curious under a 
conventional reading of the practices and preferences of economic actors as powerful 
‘elites’ pursuing economically rational policy outcomes. However in terms of thinking 
about how employers are conceived in academic research, the analysis uncovered 
multiple instances of employers reporting their personal ‘values’, with all of their 
associated contradictions and irrationalities, as opposed to the functional ‘values’ of their 
firm. This points towards the need for researchers to be critically reflective of how they 
elect to portray ‘elite’ actors in the political-economy of immigration policy: elites are 
ultimately individuals situated within larger social, economic and political networks and 
structures which inevitably shape their values (Cormode and Hughes, 1999).  
 
5.2.  THE ‘IDEAL’ IMMIGRATION POLICY FOR SCOTLAND  
The previous section has argued that employers construct narratives which make a case 
for immigration policies that suit their business interests by positioning their case relative 
to Scotland’s ‘problems’ and what ‘we need’ in Scotland. It has also highlighted the 
importance of thinking carefully about how the voices of ‘elites’ such as employers are 
presented in migration studies. The analysis now turns to consideration of the ‘ideal’ 
Scottish immigration policy from the perspective of employers. At the time that the 
research was carried out Scotland did not have direct control over immigration policy. 
However most respondents felt that the Scottish Government would soon have greater 
control over at least some elements of it in the near future, either through independence 
or enhanced devolution of powers from Westminster.  
 
  In sum, employer preferences centred on a desire for continued labour mobility 
within Europe, as provided under EU law, and a wish for measures to enhance the ability 
of businesses to recruit highly skilled workers through changes to the UK five-tier Points  
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Based System (PBS) for migrants from outside the EU. Rather than a radical 
liberalisation of immigration policy, interviewees generally called for pragmatic and 
quite minor adjustments to legislation, were Scotland to gain the relevant policy levers to 
shape its own immigration policy. Other interviewees were generally content with and 
therefore in favour of a continuation of the status quo with regards to the legislative 
environment governing immigration.  
 
‘The free movement of both goods and people is very important to us, so if we [Scotland] 
become independent then for reasons of competitiveness it’d be more important to be a 
member of the European Union than anything else… but as things stand we do well 
already out of Europe and the free movement that it brings’.  
 
James, logistics and transport 
 
  The level of contentment with, or at least lack of widespread opposition to, 
current UK immigration policy was perhaps surprising given suggestions from the 
literature that business is fundamentally in favour of liberal immigration policies 
(Giordani and Ruta, 2011; Cerna, 2014).  However when employers did raise concerns 
they often related not so much to concrete policy measures but to the negative rhetoric 
surrounding immigration at the UK level.  
 
‘We have to make sure that we are open for business in terms of the migration of talent 
and that we are seen in that way too. We kind of have that here [Scotland] because there 
is a very strong cross-party consensus that the free movement of people is absolutely 
crucial to Scotland’s wellbeing… but I don’t think that the UK at the moment is really 
positioning itself as open and welcoming for the attraction of international talent’.  
Toby, higher education  
 
  In this sense Scotland was positioned as being ‘different’ to the rest of the UK, 
where generally positive discourses were compared favourably to the perceived 
negatively surrounding political discussions of immigration south of the border.   
 
‘Alex Salmond has positively welcomed them [migrants] and said that they’ll be 
welcomed to Scotland and local government too has been really good for funding free 
language lessons… but there’s the racism aspect down in England where they’re saying 
they’re all thieves, gypsies and beggars, so people are coming up to Scotland because 
they know that there’s less racism here’  
Thomas, recruitment, hospitality 
 
  In terms of the political-economy of immigration policy, conceptually what is of 
interest is not the particular legislative mechanisms that employers would like to see  
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enacted, but rather the discourses that are constructed to rationalise these aims, and the 
actions that are made to actualise them. These narratives tended to centre on the 
‘exceptional’ nature of Scotland’s (economic and demographic) ‘needs’ for migrants and 
how the ability to attract hyper mobile ‘top talent’ was seen as essential to the success of 
companies and economies in an intensely competitive global arena. In this sense what 
was ‘good’ or ‘essential’ for employers in terms of immigration was constructed as being 
inevitably ‘good’ or ‘essential’ for Scotland. In line with the observations of scholars 
such as Scott (2013), employers were less likely to portray immigration in terms that 
framed it as an important mechanism in the hegemony of capital over labour. Analysis of 
the interview transcripts also leads to a questioning of the depiction of ‘business 
interests’ as a homogenous, unified or even powerful voice in immigration policy. Rather 
employer desires were often poorly articulated, conflicted with each other and often did 
not advocate purely ‘open-door’ immigration policies. This complexity in terms of ‘elite’ 
voices extended to how employers sought to influence immigration policy.  
 
5.3.  ‘ELITE’ DOMINATION OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY?  
Employer pressure is often framed as being influential in states producing immigration 
policies that are more liberal than their citizens would like (Menz, 2011). This is 
presented as the outcome of an organised pro-migration lobby ‘winning over’ a larger but 
resource weak and diffuse anti-migration lobby (Freeman, 1995). Determining whether 
employer voices ultimately ‘win’ in immigration policy is beyond the scope of this paper, 
and perhaps empirical elucidation more generally. What does however emerge from the 
research is an appreciation of the limited efficacy of so-called elite attitudes and actions 
in relation to immigration policy (Giordani and Ruta, 2011). The constitutional change 
debate proved to be a valuable lens through which employer views and influence on 
immigration policy could be explored: with many interviewees describing the situation as 
an opportunity for more favourable legislation to develop.  
 
‘Scottish independence could create better policy responses to our needs, and it is much 
easier to get the ear of a Minister here than it is in the UK Government… but the Scottish 
Government would be pressurised by everybody; the oil industry, retail, hospitality and 
manufacturing think they’ll all going to get the ear of government and that they’ll 
prioritise their respective industries, but some of them will have to lose out’.  
Rory, healthcare 
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  As the above quotation illustrates, employers inevitably have competing demands 
on government priorities. In line with Caviedes (2010) this range of preferences 
unsurprisingly leads to divisions between and within economic sectors in relation to 
which ‘elite’ voices are heard.  
 
‘Independence would mean that we could sort out all of those messy migration policies 
that we have issues with, but given that the Yes campaign makes a big deal out of the oil 
industry, they really need to talk to the oil industry... they’re engaging with organisations 
like the Wood Group because of Sir Ian Wood, but they are not engaging with the vast 
majority of other businesses that are actually supporting the sector and who produce 
more money for the UK than these guys do’. 
 
Olivia, oil and gas 
 
  Even when interviewees did claim to make efforts to influence (both UK and 
Scottish) government policy, it was unclear how these processes operate or what their 
actual effects might be. This may be attributed to three key factors: (1) employers, whilst 
wishing to send out a message that immigration was broadly beneficial, were not 
particularly articulate in terms of what types of specific legislation they actually wanted, 
(2) interviewees were uncertain whether their efforts at influencing policy had any 
measurable impact and (3) research participants displayed a limited understanding of the 
actual mechanisms through which their preferences might be translated into policy. Thus 
whilst there was a consensus that disseminating positive messages about immigration to 
politicians, policymakers, the media and the public was desirable, much less confidence 
surrounded whether this had a tangible effect on policy. For example Wayne (inter-
company organisation) complained that ‘we try and guide economic policy in Scotland so 
that business is doing better, but growing the economy and business is a minority voice in 
Scotland’. Similarly Harriet (agribusiness) protested that ‘we are lobbying and rural MPs 
are putting in reports too but it just doesn’t matter, you might as well be speaking to a 
brick wall’.   
 
  The picture that emerges from this analysis is not therefore one that conforms to 
the notion of state immigration polices being at the behest of an articulate, unified and 
powerful pro-business voice. It can be reasonably assumed that pro-business voices do 
influence immigration policy, but in probability they do so in often indirect, unintended 
and imperceptible ways. The perception of employers (and others) as dominant ‘elites’ 
manipulating immigration policy may therefore be misplaced. A conclusion that is more  
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realistic, but perhaps less intellectually satisfying, ties in with the notion of policy 
incoherence: elites in all probability do influence immigration policy, but do so in 
numerous and complex ways that are difficult for researchers and even elites to identify 
and articulate (Boswell, 2007; Menz, 2011; Statham and Geddes, 2006).  
 
6.  DISCUSSION: RE-THINKING ‘ELITE’ VOICES IN 
MIGRATION RESEARCH  
  Immigration policy theory is an important but under researched topic. This 
analysis has sought to contribute to its development by focusing on a particular aspect of 
the relationship between businesses and the state and its public; the preferences and role 
of employers with regards to immigration legislation. This perspective has pointed 
towards the need for a more critical take on the narratives used by businesses to 
rationalise their favouring of more liberal immigration policies than the public would like 
and contradictions within articulations of their ‘ideal’ immigration policy. It also 
emphasises that, counter to some opinion, immigration policy should not be viewed as 
the result of an organised pro-migration lobby ‘winning over’ a resource weak and 
diffuse anti-migration lobby (Freeman, 1995).   
 
  The research findings support the expectation that employers are generally very 
much in favour of immigration, as it serves to enhance the supply of labour available to 
them and thus helps to address skills and labour shortages. Narratives used to rationalise 
a pro-immigration stance centred on immigration being inherently ‘good’ for Scotland 
and Scotland’s economic and demographic needs being ‘different’ to other parts of 
Britain, especially the South East of England. Uncertainty over the constitutional future 
of Scotland was regarded as an opportunity by employers, who saw it as a chance to raise 
and perhaps push for policies better suited to ‘Scotland’s needs’. A critical interpretation 
of these discourses leads one to reflect on what is not voiced by employers. As Scott 
(2013) and Anderson and Ruhs (2010) have emphasised, few if any businesses will 
interpret increased labour immigration as a mechanism favouring the intensification of 
workplace regimes and exerting downward pressure on wages and conditions for 
employees, migrant and non-migrant alike. The role of immigration in facilitating the 
escalation of ‘flexible’ labour market structures, at various levels of the occupational  
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hierarchy, is an issue that merits much more attention than it has received to date (Røed 
and Schøne, 2012; Ruhs, 2006; Castles and Kosack, 2010). 
 
  Whilst employer preferences for positive approaches to immigration legislation 
have long been acknowledged (Castles and Kosack, 1973), an important contribution of 
this analysis is that it encourages a more nuanced understanding of how ‘elites’ such as 
employers are portrayed in migration studies. The narrow neo-classical view of labour 
migrants as economically rational and utility maximising units has long been open to the 
charge from postmodernists that such a representation discounts the innate contradictions 
and complexity of human thought and action (Papastergiadis, 2000). Whilst 
understandings of migrant behaviour have evolved far beyond simplistic rational choice 
models, elites such as employers are still often framed as behaving in such a 
deterministic manner. However this research uncovered many instances of employers 
thinking and acting in ways that contradict expectations of private businesses as purely 
profit maximising actors. For example many interviewees freely drew attention to the 
perceived negative aspects of immigration and used pejorative terminology to describe 
immigrants. So whilst the literature might conceive of business elites as being more 
concerned with success in a globalised economic arena than parochial national political 
issues (Lasch, 1995; Sklair, 1991), the reality is more nuanced. It is sometimes forgotten 
that business elites are also individuals and as such are situated within and influenced by 
wider networks and structures (Cormode and Hughes, 1999). So although their overall 
stance can be described as pro-immigration, their views and the narratives that they use 
to rationalise them can be thought of as unstable and internally contradictory as a 
consequence of this embeddedness (Shubin et al, 2014). The views of ‘the public’ and 
private business, whilst distinctly different, may therefore not be quite as far apart as is 
sometimes assumed. Employers are in the main pro-immigration, but not without 
reservation. Similarly social attitudes data shows that the public is generally opposed to 
immigration, yet recognises the positive economic aspects of it (Saran, 2009; Rolfe et al, 
2013; Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014). A more sophisticated interpretation of the 
preferences of elites and general publics is thus warranted in migration studies.  
 
  Finally, the analysis rejects the view of immigration policy as being determined 
by the lobbying efforts of an organised and coherent body of elites. Just like the public, 
employers express dissatisfaction with immigration policy (although usually for different  
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reasons). Whilst this research cannot shed light on the actual impact of pro-business 
preferences on immigration policy, it can encourage a more sophisticated 
conceptualisation of these key labour market actors in migration studies. Employers hold 
divergent views and are not particularly articulate regarding the immigration policies that 
they would like to see, are not confident that their voices are listened to by policymakers 
and are unsure of the mechanisms whereby their preferences might be translated into 
policies. How a diverse set of competing voices are translated into immigration policy 
therefore remains something of a ‘black box’ in the minds of businesses and indeed the 
authors of this article. Whose voices are prioritised by policymakers in these tussles 
remains an important question that is very difficult to prove. The perennial question of 
whose voices should be listened to is of even greater significance.   
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